Whatever gains may come from fighting wars, economic growth is not among them. We examine the long-run impact of interstate conflict on real GDP per capita for a cross section of countries between 1960 and 2000. We construct a fatality-weighted conflict variable that accounts for both the severity and endogeneity of individual confrontations. We include our conflict measure in a deep determinants income regression in which we control for trade, institutions and geography. We find that a standard deviation increase in fatality-weighted conflict over the period 1960 to 2000 results in an average decrease of about a tenth of a standard deviation in 2000 real GDP per capita.
I. INTRODUCTION
Frédéric Bastiat"s Parable of the Broken Window highlights the difference between cost and opportunity cost. The bystanders mistakenly assume that if the window had not been broken, then nothing would have been produced. In fact, the full opportunity cost of the broken window includes the bread that the shopkeeper can no longer afford to purchase because he now needs to fix his shop"s window. While simple when applied to the shopkeeper, the Parable of the Broken Window is often misunderstood, perhaps nowhere with more unfortunate consequences than with regards to the economic cost of war.
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Despite the logic of the parable, there is no clear consensus on the economic consequences of interstate wars.
2 One line of reasoning argues that war is harmful to the economy. Simply put, war kills people, destroys property, restricts trade, and retards capital formation. Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) estimate that major external conflict in the previous two years has a negative contemporaneous impact on growth. Glick and Taylor (2010) also find a negative short run relationship between war and growth. They estimate that the 1 As an example, in a September 14, 2001 article "After the Horror" in the New York Times, Paul Krugman wrote: "Ghastly as it may seem to say this, the terror attack -like the original "day of infamy" which brought an end to the Great Depression -could even do some economic good. [...] the driving force behind the economic slowdown has been a plunge in business investment. Now, all of a sudden, we need some new office buildings. As I've already indicated, the destruction isn't big compared with the economy, but rebuilding will generate at least some increase in business spending." Following this article, Walter E. Williams accused Krugman of committing the broken-window fallacy and wrote in an article "There"s No Free Lunch" in the October 4, 2001 Jewish World Review: "Would there have been even greater "economic good" had the terrorists succeeded in destroying buildings in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston and all other major cities? Of course, you and I know that is utter nonsense. Property destruction always lowers the wealth of a nation." 2 There is a large literature on intrastate (or civil) conflict as well, however, our focus is on war between states. As such, throughout the paper we use "war" interchangeably with interstate conflict.
2 indirect cost of World Wars I and II stemming from lost trade were even greater than the direct costs associated with the loss of life.
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On the other hand, even attempts to answer the relatively narrow question, "Does war reduce trade?"often end up finding no effect. 4 It should come as no surprise, then, that there are many who also argue that the effect of war on the overall economy is ambiguous, or even positive. In the short-run, wartime expenditures increase aggregate demand and the level of real GDP. 5 Military research and production can increase innovation and technological progress in the long-run (Alchian, 1963; Kuznets, 1964; and Ruttan, 2006) . Similarly, war can eliminate distributional coalitions, thereby reducing rent seeking, especially for the "losers" of the conflict (Olson, 1982) . For the U.S., conventional wisdom is that the Second World War saved the U.S.
economy from an even longer depression and planted the seeds for future prosperity.
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In this paper, we examine the long-run economic impact of interstate war. We construct a cross-country measure of interstate conflict between 1960 and 2000 that accounts for both the severity and endogeneity of individual confrontations. We then estimate the effect of interstate war on the level of real GDP per capita in 2000 controlling for differences in trade intensity, institutional quality and geographic location. We find that war reduces the long-run level of real GDP per person.
The estimation of the impact of war on economic performance poses five challenges to the researcher. First, interstate conflict is a bilateral action between two or more nations, while economic performance is largely an independent (or autonomous) outcome. As such, studies of 3 interstate conflict and international trade (c.f. Martin, Mayer and Thoenig, 2008) estimate bilateral gravity models, while research into long-run economic performance use cross-country growth models (c.f. Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004) . Second, the magnitude of the impact of interstate conflict can vary. There is no reason to expect that a border skirmish has the same impact as a major war. Any measure of conflict should take this into account by using appropriate weights that capture severity. Third, interstate conflict and economic outcomes may be jointly determined, therefore, an exogenous instrument for interstate conflict is needed to establish causality. Fourth, the timing of interstate conflict is not clear-cut. Both the pre-war mobilization and the post-war impact can vary considerably across countries and conflicts. Fifth, the coverage of the cross-country sample must be extensive in order to include the high conflict nations.
We construct a three-part empirical model to address the five challenges listed above. In the first part, we model conflict as a jointly-determined outcome between two nations. We use a probit to estimate the probability of a war between any two countries based on geographic, historical and political factors. The predicted values are expected to be unrelated to economic outcomes like trade and production and thus can be used as instruments (Glick and Taylor, 2010) . In the second part of the model, we aggregate up from bilateral conflicts to a crosscountry measure. For each country, we add up the actual and predicted bilateral conflicts across all potential combatants. We then weight these actual and predicted values by average fatalities per day to account for the severity of each bilateral conflict. 7 Barro (1981) uses battle deaths per 1,000 people to measure the intensity of war for the U.S.
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In the third part, we include our interstate conflict measure in a deep determinants income regression. 8 The deep determinants approach specifies that the level of income at the end of the period of study is a function of the average values of trade, institutional quality, and geography over the previous periods. As such, it elides over relatively short run factors (e.g. capital accumulation and productivity) in favor of using more fundamental factors to explain long run economic success. 9 Because of its simplicity, the deep determinants approach maximizes the sample coverage, thereby allowing us to include many of the poorest countries where war has been most prevalent during the last fifty years. Furthermore, addressing endogeneity concerns is facilitated by the existence of instruments for institutional quality and trade that have already been identified in the cross country growth literature. Most importantly, however, the deep determinants approach allows us to focus on the long-run. As explained above, existing studies that focus on the short run effect of war come up with mixed results. Is war simply a transitory supply shock? A minor blip in growth rates that can be erased within a few years? 10 Or, do its effects continue to haunt the economy long after the dead have been buried and trade relations mended? Robert Higgs (1985) , for example, makes a plausible case for war "ratcheting up" the size of government. He argues that this undermines long run outcomes, but is there any systematic empirical evidence for this? Or, do the long run benefits of the inventions that are developed and rushed into use during war years outweigh any costs due to government growth?
Our approach can help answer these questions. 8 Papers by Hall and Jones (1999) , Frankel and Romer (1999) , Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Sachs (2003) examine the role of trade, institutions and/or geography as deep determinants of the long-run level of real GDP per person. Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) combine the three factors together into a unified framework. 9 Hall and Jones (1999) provide several arguments as to why the level of output is a more appropriate measure of outcomes than growth rates when attempting to explain long run growth. 10 For example, in addition to the citations above, Kugler (1973) ; Organski and Kugler (1977); and Rasler and Thompson (1985) argue that war has a negative effect in the short-run, but little to no effect on long-run growth. This has been dubbed the "Phoenix" factor. Using cross-country data, Koubi (2005) estimates a negative contemporaneous and positive long-run relationship between war and economic growth.
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The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. Section II details our empirical approach and estimation strategy, while section III provides information on the data we use.
Section IV outlines our core empirical results as well as subsequent sensitivity analysis. Section V concludes.
II. EMPIRICAL APPROACH AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY

A. Bilateral Conflict Equation
We subscribe to the "Rationalist" interpretation for why bilateral conflict occurs.
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According to the Rationalist, the joint utility of two countries at peace is always greater than their joint utility at war. However, the presence of imperfect information may cause disagreements over how to distribute the gains from peace. 12 Accordingly, the probability that two countries will go to war depends on two sets of contributing factors. The first set of factors contributes to the probability of a disagreement over the distribution of the gains from peace (e.g. bilateral distance, common language, prior disagreements, etc.). The second set of factors causes a disagreement to escalate because of imperfect information (e.g. the nature of political institutions, formal alliances, size of respective militaries).
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We define an indicator variable c ijt , which is 1 if the two countries, i and j, are engaged in a conflict during year t; and 0 otherwise. P(c ijt = 1| g,h,p) is then the probability that i and j are at war in year t conditional on geographical characteristics g (e.g. bilateral distance, common 11 See Grossman (2003) for an example of the Rationalist approach. Powell (1999) surveys different approaches to explaining war. Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008) present a formal model based on the Rationalist approach which results in a probit specification similar to ours. 12 Each country wishes to maximize its share of the gains from peace. In a world of imperfect information, it is possible to demand a larger share than the other country is willing to accept. This results in escalation towards war. A famous example of such a miscalculation is the underestimation of Chinese tolerance towards the U.S. occupation of North Korea by General MacArthur in October 1950. This miscalculation directly contributed to the run-up to the Korean War. 13 We recognize that the set of factors which determines the probability of disagreement overlaps with the set which determines the probability of escalation. This is irrelevant, however, to our main goal which is to identify factors which contribute to war that are exogenous to the long-run determinants of economic growth. 6 border); shared historical factors h (e.g. common language, common colonizer); and relative political measures p (e.g. relative values of democracy, number of communist countries) that contribute to disagreement and escalation. 14 The response probability for a conflict is then
where  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and the standard errors of the estimates of  0 ,  1 ,  2 ,  3 are asymptotically standard normal.
The key identifying assumption is that the bilateral geographic, historical, and political factors are exogenous to each country"s individual economic outcome. In particular, we are assuming that geographic isolation, historical relationships and political interplay between nations will impact an individual country"s income only through its interactions with other countries. For example, the fact that France and Germany share a common border raises the probability of conflict, which could impact the income level of each country. However, geographic proximity of the two nations is unlikely to have a direct effect on the income level of each. This assumption allows us to generate a valid instrument: one that is independent of the error term in the cross-country income regression.
B. Cross-Country Conflict Measure
We create an aggregate measure of conflict for each country i in year t as a weighted sum of bilateral conflicts with all countries j during year t:
where w is a weight, c is bilateral conflict and J is the number of potential combatant countries.
The weight 
This cross-country conflict variable will be used to test the impact of war on the long-run level of real GDP per person.
We use the predicted probability of bilateral conflict ˆi jt c from (1) to create an instrument for cross-country conflict:
The instrumentˆi C will be used to control for the endogeneity (or reverse causality) of conflict in the cross-country income regression. 15 Ex-ante, it is unlikely that leaders know how many war fatalities will be sustained when entering a conflict. Further, this should be especially true for conflicts resulting in large fatalities, ex post, which are the ones receiving the most weight in our framework.
C. Cross-Country Income Regression
The empirical growth literature has used either growth rates or levels to estimate the determinants of cross-country growth. The first generation of studies used annual average growth rates to estimate the impact of variables such as capital accumulation, education, and inflation on long-run growth. 16 These researchers sought to estimate the "proximate" causes of growth, but found very few stable and reliable relationships. For one thing, the use of multiple specifications generated highly unreliable and fragile results Renelt, 1992 and Salai-Martin et. al., 2004) . For another, the documentation of highly volatile growth rates through time called the econometrics of using growth rates into question (Pritchett, 2000) .
In response, a deep determinants approach has emerged to attempt to answer the question, "why are some countries rich and others poor?" 17 The deep determinants approach relates the level of real per capita income in the latest year to a few fundamental or "deep"
sources. The inclusion of a few deep determinants (i.e. geography, institutions, trade) limits the specification problems encountered by approaches using growth rates. Moreover, the use of the level of per capita income in the latest year also avoids some of the econometric problems inherent in growth rates. Perhaps most importantly, the deep determinants approach allows us to either borrow or create valid instruments for potentially endogenous independent variables. We get our instruments for trade and rule of law from Frankel and Romer (1999) and Hall and Jones (1999) , respectively. One of our main contributions is to create an instrument for war which borrows equally from the approaches of Frankel and Romer (1999) and Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008) .
16 Barro (1991) is an excellent example. 17 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001); Easterly and Levine (2003) ; Dollar and Kraay (2003) ; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004); and Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silane and Shleifer (2004) are examples.
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We add our cross-country conflict measure to a deep determinants regression:
where Y/pop is the level of per capita income, C is conflict, T is trade, I is institutions, G is geography, and  is an i.i.d. error term.
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We estimate the cross-country income equation (4) using two-stage least squares (2SLS).
The identification strategy is to use fitted cross-country conflict to instrument actual crosscountry conflict, fitted trade intensity from Frankel and Romer (1999) to instrument for trade intensity, and English and European language fractionalization to instrument for institutions (used by Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2004) . In the first-stage, we estimate the following three regressions: 
where Ĉ is fitted conflict, T is fitted trade intensity, LANG are the two language fractionalization variables, G is geography, and (u,v,z) are i.i.d. error terms. In the second stage,
we regress log(Y/pop) on the three predicted values from (5)- (7) and G.
Instrumental variables must satisfy two requirements for asymptotic consistency. They must be orthogonal to the error term (validity) and must be correlated with the included endogenous variable (relevance). To support the validity of our instrumental variables, we 18 The deep determinants approach does not predict the exact functional form (i.e. logs or levels) of the relationship between each deep determinant and real GDP per capita. We therefore conducted specification tests using a generalized R-squared criterion to determine the proper specification of conflict. The generalized R-squared test is a measure of explanatory power for models with endogenous explanatory variables (Pesaran and Smith, 1994) . The tests results found that the log of conflict did much better in fitting the data than the level of conflict.
report the Hansen J statistic, keeping in mind that we can test for validity only when the number of excluded instruments exceeds the number of endogenous variables (over-identification).
Relevance is checked by examining the first-stage F statistics.
The recent literature on weak instruments (c.f. Stock, Wright and Yogo, 2002) has shown that mere instrument relevance may not be sufficient. In other words, rejection of the null of under-identification does not ensure reliable IV inference. Thus, we also use the Shea (1997) partial R-squared statistic and the Stock and Yogo (2005) country pairs, of which 369,999 are in our preferred specification for the probit in equation (1) 11 (results in column 3 of Table 2 ). The cross-country dataset is a cross-section of 158 current states. We lose Myanmar and the 9 former nations due to a lack of real GDP measure in 2000. 22 We use the Dyadic Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset Version 2.0 (DYDMID2.0) of Maoz (2005) as our source of bilateral conflicts. DYDMID2.0 codes each dispute as "Threat to
Use Force", "Display of Force", "Use of Force", and "War". We follow Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008) and define conflict as those forceful disputes recorded as "Use of Force" and "War". Table 1 shows the frequency of conflict in our bilateral dataset. In the complete sample, there are 1,463 conflicts out of 456,484 possible country pairs for a 0.32% incidence rate. In the preferred sample, there are 1,406 conflicts out of 366,999 country pairs for a 0.38% incidence rate. Thus, the use of our smaller sample appears to have little effect on the frequency rate of interstate conflict.
[Insert Table 1 about here] For continuity, we use the variables suggested by Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008) to choose the geographical, historical and political determinants of bilateral conflict. 23 For geographical factors, we use years since last conflict, log of bilateral distance, log sum of surface area, and dummies for conflict in previous year and common border. For historical variables, we use dummies for common language, common legal system, common colonizer post-1945, 22 The fact that our outcome measure is real GDP per person in 2000 introduces a potential selection bias in our sample. It is likely that countries that fought wars and then did very poor economically didn't survive until 2000. This selection bias would bias our results against finding a negative impact of war on income. 23 We also included resource variables such as subsoil wealth, number of oil producers, number of gas producers, and access to seas. Each variable only had marginal explanatory power in the model.
colonizer-colonist post-1945, and were/are part of the same country. 24 We obtain the geography and historical data from CEPII (2008) . For political factors, we include the number of GATT/WTO members, number of communist states, dummy of a lagged defence alliance, sum of Polity, difference in Polity, lagged log sum of military personnel, and lagged log difference in military personnel. The defence alliance data comes from Gibler and Sarkees (2004) . Polity is a composite measure of democratic institutions and comes from the Polity IV Project (2008) . The military personnel data comes from the National Material Capabilities Version 3.02 dataset of Singer (1987) .
We obtain fatalities per conflict estimates from two sources. Our primary source is the deaths. We use the median value of each category to generate a continuous conflict estimate for fatality categories 1-3. For fatalities greater than 250, we use the more precise estimate from the Armed Conflict dataset.
We measure fatalities per day for country i with country j in year t as: language fractionalization is the proportion of a country"s population that speaks English and the proportion that speaks a major European language, respectively. We use data from Hall and Jones (1999) and fill in missing values using Gordon (2005) . We measure geography as the absolute distance from the equator reported in the CIA Factbook (2008).
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Probit Results
We use a probit estimator to generate the predicted bilateral conflict probabilities in (1).
We use bilateral data from 1960 to 2000. Table 2 presents the results of three specifications.
The first specification includes the geography variables; the second adds the historical factors, and the third adds the political measures. We use the results of the third specification to construct our bilateral conflict probabilities.
14 [Insert Table 2 about Here]
The results are similar to those found in the conflict literature (c.f. Altfield and De Mesquita, 1979 and Martin, Mayer and Thoenig, 2008) . In each specification, the coefficient for years since last conflict is negative, while that for conflict in previous year is positive. The coefficient signs support the idea that wars are endemic. Likewise, the coefficient for surface area is positive. Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008) argue that countries with large surface areas are more likely to have large minorities that can be a source of conflict with neighboring countries (like Turkey with Iraq). Interestingly, the coefficient for common language is positive, while that for common legal system is negative. We interpret these signs to mean that a common legal system is a more appropriate measure of cultural likeness than a common language. The coefficients for colonial linkages and same state are all positive, indicating the greater likelihood of conflicts with colonial masters and breakaway states. In the third specification, we find that the coefficient for sum of Polity is negative and that for absolute difference is positive. This suggests that autocracies in general are more likely to fight than democracies, but more likely to wage war vs. democracies than other autocracies.
B. Cross-country Conflict Measures
We use equations (1), (2) [Insert Table 3 about Here]
Columns (1) and (2) and significant under OLS. Using 2SLS, we get the common result that institutions dominate in that the coefficient for rule of law increases markedly, while those for trade and geography decrease in value and in precision (Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004 In order to assess the possible influence of Iraq, Iran, Eritrea and other individual countries, we report details on the leverage and squared residuals of each observation in Appendix C. Leverage is a measure of how far an observation differs from the mean of the sample, while a large residual indicates that the observation is not well explained by the model.
Iran and Iraq both exhibit a large degree of leverage, while Eritrea has both a large residual and leverage. As a result, these certainly support our prior belief based on Figure 1 that Iraq, Iran, and Eritrea may be possible outliers.
In columns (3) and (4) of (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) for an average of 14 causalities per day over a ten-year period.
when we control for endogeneity under 2SLS, the coefficient for conflict increases in magnitude to -0.229 and is now significant at the 5 percent level. In terms of impact, the point estimate in column (4) implies that a standard deviation increase in fatality weighted conflict leads to a decrease of about 14% of a standard deviation of 2000 real GDP.
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Another possibility for the insignificant relationship between conflict and real GDP per capita is omitted variable bias. Although the deep determinants approach explains close to twothirds of the variation in our sample, important unobserved factors may remain. These unobserved factors are likely a product of a complex set of historical and geographical issues.
There are two approaches taken in the growth literature to control for unobserved effects. The first is to include fixed effects in a panel data structure (c.f. Islam, 1995) . The second is to include a set of continental 0-1 dummy variables (c.f. Barro, 1991 and Sala-i-Martin, 1997) . We chose the second approach in order to utilize the cross-sectional information of conflict and the other deep determinants.
We follow the standard convention in the deep determinants literature (c.f. Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004) and include dummy variables for major oil producers, subSaharan Africa, Latin America and East Asia in columns (5) and (6). 30 With the exception of East Asia, the dummy variables have their predicted signs and are significant. The coefficient for conflict is negative and significant under 2SLS. Although smaller in magnitude than before, the point estimate in column (6) implies that a one standard deviation increase in fatalityweighted conflict reduces real GDP per person by about 9% of a standard deviation. 29 To make this result more concrete, the mean of our 2000 real GDP per capita in log terms is 8.42342, while a standard deviation is 1.18860. Thus 14% of a standard deviation would represent a reduction from the mean to 8.25702. In levels terms this represents a reduction from $4552 to $3855. This is clearly a large effect. 30 There are 12 major oil producers in our sample: Algeria, Bahrain, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.
18
The 2SLS coefficients in (4) and (6) We can therefore reject the null of weak instruments. Taken together, the results in (4) and (6) provide solid evidence that interstate conflict has a negative impact on long-run economic development.
D. Robustness
It is well-known that cross-country growth regressions are highly sensitive to specification choice (c.f. Renelt, 1992 and Sala-i-Martin, 1997) . In this section, we test the robustness of the negative link between conflict and economic development to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables and civil conflict measures. To examine the robustness of our specification, we include additional explanatory variables to our deep determinants regression found in (6) of Table 3 . We include those variables found to be important by other researchers. These alternative specifications are reported in Table 4 . To conserve space, we report the coefficient value (and standard error) for each deep determinant C,
T, I and G and the p-value of a test of significance of the additional variable(s). We report the
Hansen J and Cragg-Donald statistics at the bottom. For comparison purposes, we show the benchmark result in column (1) where the coefficient for conflict is -0.13 in value.
[Insert Table 4 about Here] 31 The critical value is calculated as a function of the number of endogenous regressors (n), the number of instrumental variables (K) and the desired maximal size (r) of a Wald test of β = β 0 , when the significance level is 5 percent. In our case, the critical values for r = 0.10 and r = 0.15 are 10.01 and 6.48, respectively (Batten and Martina, 2007) .
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The first three specifications consider the additional roles of geography, disease and health differences. In column (2), we include the geographic controls -landlocked and log of surface area (see Frankel and Romer, 1999) . These two variables are jointly significant, while the coefficient for conflict remains negative and significant. Recent work by Sachs (2003) and Carstensen and Gundlach (2006) show that malaria has direct effects on real GDP per capita. In column (3), we include malaria prevalence as an additional factor. Although the coefficient for malaria is negative and strongly significant, the coefficient for conflict remains negative and significant. To control for health differences, we add the log of life expectancy in 1960 in column (4). The coefficient for life expectancy is positive and significant, while the coefficient for conflict remains close to its benchmark value.
The next two specifications examine institutional and historical differences. In column (5), we include ethnic, language, and religious fractionalization measures of Alesina et al. (2004) . The fractionalization measures record the heterogeneity in the population, but are jointly insignificant. The coefficient for conflict remains close to its benchmark value. We next add
French and British legal origin in column (6). As with fractionalization, the legal origin variables are jointly insignificant, while conflict remains negative and significant. Although not reported, we also included colonial origin variables and found that the coefficient for conflict remained close to its benchmark value.
Column (7) (Collier 1999, p. 168) ." We do not dispute the claim that intrastate conflict may be more harmful to economic development than interstate conflict. We are interested, however, in whether our results are driven by civil conflict. Given the propensity for interstate conflict to become civil conflict and vice versa, this may be the case.
In column (8), we jointly include five measures for civil conflict within our regression:
ethnic conflict, revolutionary war, adverse regime change, genocide/politicide, and state failure.
The data are from the Political Instability Task Force data set. We average each measure over the 1960 to 2000 period. In our 158 country sample, more than half experienced some form of civil conflict. With these 5 civil war measures included, the coefficient for interstate conflict remains strong and significantly negative. The test for joint significance of our civil conflict measures, however, is insignificant. This is somewhat surprising given the findings of Collier and others (c.f. Collier, 1999 and Murdoch and Sandler, 2004) . However, there is a strong negative correlation between civil conflict and rule of law. As a result, most if not all of the explanatory power of civil conflict is taken away by rule of law.
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Lastly, we examine the impact of interstate conflict on developing economies. To do so, we estimate the model excluding the 31 OECD or developed countries. With a point estimate of -0.15 for conflict, we find a stable negative impact of interstate war on the level of per capita income in the developing world.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper makes three fundamental contributions to the literatures on growth and conflict. First, we develop a unique measure of interstate conflict that captures both the frequency and severity of war. Second, we construct a strong instrument for conflict which is orthogonal to other possible explanations of economic outcomes. Third, when added to a deep determinants regression, we find evidence that interstate conflict results in a significant decrease in long-run economic development.
We find that a one standard deviation increase in fatality-weighted conflict results in an average reduction in real GDP per capita of between 0.09 and 0.14 of a standard deviation. Our estimate is consistent with common sense and is fairly stable across different specifications of our cross-country regression. Most surprisingly, these results suggest that the costs of war stay with a country much longer than is implied by previous studies. Even if an economy grows quickly after a war is over, our results imply that this will not be enough to return standards of living to where they would have been in the absence of conflict. War is more than a transitory supply shock, it permanently alters the economic potential of the country. This paper began with Bastiat"s Parable of the Broken Window which suggests that a full accounting of the costs of interstate conflict could only result in the conclusion that increased conflict is bad for long-run outcomes. Bastiat"s intuition is vindicated by our econometric results. In addition to its horrific ethical costs, interstate war also delivers significant economic consequences long after the guns have been silenced. Note: We estimated each equation using ordinary least squares (OLS) and ( 2SLS). The instruments used in 2SLS are the log of fitted conflict, English fractionalization, European fractionalization, and the log of fitted trade intensity. Robust standard errors are in parentheses where *, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Appendix C: Outlier Analysis
In order to consider the possibility that Iran, Iraq, and Eritrea are outliers, we consider three issues. First, an observation may not be well-explained by the model and thus have a large residual. As a result, the observation is not well-explained by the data. Second, an observation may be far from the mean of the distribution and thus have leverage. A least squares regression fit will attempt to prevent such a point from having a sizable residual. Third, an observation may have an impact on the point estimate and thus have influence. Influence is a combination of large residual and leverage. Figure C1 provides visual evidence of possible outliers. figure C1 , Iraq (IRQ) and Iran (IRN) exhibit extremely high leverage, while Eritrea (ERI) has a large amount of leverage and residual. As a result, it appears accounting for these observations are necessary.
